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McQueen v. Gadberry2 was an 
Eastern District dissolution 
dispute over frozen pre-
implantation embryos formed 
from McQueen’s eggs and 
Gadberry’s sperm. The St. Louis 
County trial court found the 
pre-embryos to be marital 
property of a special character 
and awarded them jointly to 
each of the former spouses. The 
appellate court affirmed. 
 McQueen is an important decision because the inding that pre-
embryos are marital property was an issue of  irst impression that 
afects many Missouri families. Infertility is a common problem, 
couples frequently utilize assisted reproductive technologies 
(ART) to form families, and the extra frozen pre-implantation 
embryos (hereinafter pre-embryos) have fueled increasing legal 
disputes. Family law, health law, and estate planning attorneys 
should factor pre-embryo disposition into their repertoires.
The Issue
 “[A]s many as a million ‘leftover’ . .  . pre-embryos” are in 
frozen storage in the United States.3 Nationally, infertility afects 
13 percent of  couples, male infertility is the cause of  infertility 
in 33 percent of  couples,4 over 12 percent of  women sufer 
from infertility, and 7.3 million women of  ages 15-44 years 
have utilized ART.5 ART “includes fertility treatments in which 
eggs or embryos are handled in the laboratory (i.e., in vitro 
fertilization [IVF] and related procedures).”6 Implicit in ART is 
the collection of  gametes (ova/eggs and/or sperm) which fertility 
clinics may use to form pre-embryos, to freeze before or after 
forming pre-embryos, to artiicially inseminate women, and/or 
to transfer such pre-embryos to a woman’s uterus.
 Couples have choices as to the disposition of  their leftover 
frozen pre-embryos: “(1) keep them frozen for future use or 
indeinitely, (2) discard them by letting them thaw, (3) donate 
them to another recipient . . ., or (4) donate them to research.”7 
Such designation may also authorize posthumous use of  gametes 
of  embryos by the other progenitor, relatives, or friends of  either 
progenitor. 
 Congress passed the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and 
Certiication Act (FCSRCA) in 1992 requiring all U.S. fertility 
clinics performing ART procedures to annually report data on 
every ART procedure performed to the Centers for Disease 
Control.8 In 2013, the last year for which statistics are published, 
the CDC reported a national total of  160,521 ART procedures 
with the intent to transfer at least one embryo (range: 109 in 
Wyoming to 20,299 in California) performed in 467 U.S. fertility 
clinics. These procedures resulted in 53,252 live-birth deliveries, 
which constituted 1.6 percent of  all infants born in the United 
States that year. 
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 In 2013, Missouri’s fertility clinics (located in Kansas City, 
St. Louis, Creve Coeur, Columbia, St. Peters, and Chesterield)9 
reported 2,006 ART procedures, including 1,728 embryo 
transfers resulting in 794 pregnancies and 671 live births.10 
 Conception difers from in vitro fertilization (IVF) in that 
conception is “the onset of  pregnancy” whereas IVF is a 
laboratory procedure in which eggs are fertilized by sperm.11 
Following IVF, the resultant pre-embryos may be transferred to 
a uterus, frozen, or discarded. The success rate of  developing 
a pregnancy from transfer of  a pre-embryo is statistically equal 
whether implanting fresh or frozen pre-embryos.12 Courts 
have struggled to legally deine frozen pre-embryos. Tennessee 
famously held in Davis v. Davis that frozen pre-embryos are 
neither property or person “but occupy an interim category 
that entitles them to special respect because of  their potential 
for human life.”13 By contrast, McQueen, the irst Missouri case 
to address the legal status of  frozen pre-embryos, deined pre-
embryos as “marital property of  a special character.”14 
 This paper will review the McQueen decision, summarize 
the United States pre-embryo case law, and close with 
recommendations for Missouri lawyers. “Posthumous 
conception” or the parentage of  a deceased intended parent 
igures into frozen pre-embryo and gamete case law, but this 
paper will not examine these cases. 
The Missouri Case: McQueen v Gadberry 
The Facts
 During their marriage, McQueen (wife) and Gadberry 
(husband) patronized a St. Louis fertility clinic to harvest their 
own gametes to form frozen pre-embryos. This was because 
Gadberry’s military deployment complicated their conceiving 
children and not because either party had infertility problems, 
a factor that played in the court’s balance of  interests. The 
pre-embryos were transferred to McQueen’s uterus resulting in 
the birth of  the couple’s twins. The parties’ remaining frozen 
pre-embryos were transported to the Fairfax Cryobank storage 
facility when their St. Louis clinic closed. The Fairfax Cryobank 
required the parties to complete a “Fairfax Cryobank Directive 
Regarding the Disposition of  Embryos.”15 Gadberry and 
McQueen signed the Fairfax directive which purported to give 
control of  the frozen pre-embryos to McQueen. 
 Upon the couple’s divorce, McQueen wanted to undergo 
embryo transfer with the pre-embryos. Gadberry was opposed to 
her plan. 
 Neither McQueen nor Gadberry “dispute(d) that at the 
time the pre-embryos were created, there was no agreement or 
express recording of  the parties’ intentions regarding the number 
of  pre-embryos to be created, if  or when implantation of  any 
or all would occur, or any procedure for addressing excess or 
unused pre-embryos.”16 However, Gadberry’s and McQueen’s 
testimonies conlicted; the wife said the parties discussed giving 
the frozen pre-embryos to her in event of  dissolution while 
husband said no such discussion occurred. 
 In the dissolution, McQueen sought “custody” of  the pre-
embryos and essentially argued that they constituted children 
under § 1.205, RSMo, which provides that “[l]ife begins at 
conception” and “[u]nborn children have protectable interests 
in life.”17 McQueen cited § 188.015, RSMo for its deinitions 
of  “‘unborn child’ as ‘the ofspring of  human beings from the 
moment of  conception until birth and at every stage of  its 
biological development, including the human conceptus, zygote, 
morula, blastocyst, embryo, and fetus[.]’” and “‘conception’ 
as ‘the fertilization of  the ovum of  a female by a sperm of  a 
male[.]’”18 In the alternative, she argued that the pre-embryos 
constituted property controlled by the Fairfax directive, which 
required that the court award the pre-embryos to her.
 Gadberry argued that awarding the pre-embryos to McQueen 
would force him to procreate against his wishes and violate his 
fundamental constitutional rights to privacy and equal protection 
under the 14th Amendment. Gadberry argued that the pre-
embryos constituted property which should be awarded jointly to 
the spouses, who could use them only with signed authorizations 
of  both parties. Gadberry was agreeable to these four options: 
. . . (1) for the frozen pre-embryos to be donated to an 
infertile couple, preferably outside of  the St. Louis area; 
(2) for the frozen pre-embryos to be donated to science; 
(3) for the frozen pre-embryos to be destroyed; or (4) for 
the frozen pre-embryos to remain in their status quo of  
being frozen and stored until the parties could agree 
upon a disposition.19
Missouri Analysis and Holding
 The trial court extended the appointment of  a guardian ad 
litem for the couple’s twins to the frozen pre-embryos, found 
execution of  the Fairfax Cryobank directive lawed and invalid, 
held that the frozen pre-embryos were marital property of  
special character, and awarded the frozen pre-embryos to the 
parties jointly such that no party could decide their disposition 
without the other’s consent. McQueen appealed. 
 The Eastern District Court of  Appeals airmed the trial 
court’s award of  the frozen pre-embryos to the parties jointly. 
The court indicated it was “only required to decide whether 
frozen pre-embryos have the legal status of  children under our 
dissolution of  marriage statutes”20 and quoted a New Jersey 
court that “advances in medical technology have far outstripped 
the development of  legal principles to resolve the inevitable 
disputes arising out of  the new reproductive opportunities now 
available.”21 
 The court airmed the trial court’s credibility determination 
that the Fairfax Cryobank directive regarding disposition of  
the pre-embryos was invalid and unenforceable, and thus 
eliminated its use in dividing marital property because “it was 
not entered into freely, fairly, knowingly, understandingly, and 
in good faith with full disclosure.”22 The directive contained 
irregularities in the signature dates vis a vis notarization; the 
timing of  McQueen’s handwritten notes on the directive were 
questionable; and the parties’ testimony conlicted about the 
directive and applicable discussions. The court expressly took 
“no position on whether gamete providers may enter into a valid 
and enforceable agreement [in Missouri] regarding disposition of  
frozen pre-embryos” but noted that Florida, Texas, and Oregon 
had found such agreements enforceable.23 
 The court found that the pre-embryos in dispute had not been 
transferred to McQueen’s uterus, she was not pregnant, and the 
use of  the pre-embryos did not constitute her last procreational 
chance. Therefore, McQueen’s bodily integrity and her ability 
to procreate was not implicated and the pre-embryo disposition 
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required balancing the interests of  “entirely equal gamete 
providers.”24 Allowing McQueen’s use of  the pre-embryos would 
subject Gadberry to “unwarranted governmental intrusion 
into” his procreation and force him to become a parent.25 The 
court held that the “declarations in section 1.205 relating to the 
potential life of  frozen pre-embryos were not suicient to justify 
any infringement upon the freedom and privacy of  [the parties]” 
and airmed the trial court’s award of  the pre-embryos to the 
parties jointly.26
 The court further airmed the trial court’s inding that, 
though not explicitly mentioned in Chapter 452, the pre-
embryos did constitute “marital property of  a special character” 
and not children who have been born and whose “custody, 
visitation or support” were at issue.27 Thus, the trial court had 
lacked authority to appoint a guardian ad litem for the pre-
embryos. 
 In his dissent, Judge Dowd cited § 1.205 (life begins at 
conception), § 188.010 (conception is the fertilization of  the 
ovum of  a female by a sperm of  a male), and § 188.015 (intent 
to grant life to all humans, born and unborn) and, importantly, 
conlated fertilization and conception stating that “[i]t is 
undisputed that conception occurred in this case,”28 and inding 
that pre-embryos constitute humans. He posited that Gadberry 
had irrevocably released his reproductive rights by providing 
semen for the formation of  embryos.29 The Supreme Court of  
Missouri declined to review the case.30 
Sister State Decisions
 Fifteen states have rendered decisions in disputes over the 
products of  ART.31 A three-tiered decision tree has emerged 
that the authors use to categorize cases. First, a court evaluates 
any cryopreservation agreement typically signed in a fertility 
clinic in which the intended parents agreed to a disposition of  
frozen pre-implantation embryos. Second, courts balance the 
interests of  the parties, including whether utilization of  the 
embryos constitutes one person’s last procreative chance. Third, 
at least one court has required contemporaneous mutual consent 
despite prior agreement and wife’s last procreative chance. In 
these analyses, the existence and applicability of  public policy to 
the frozen pre-embryos, constitutional rights to privacy, and the 
characterization of  frozen pre-embryos as person, property, or an 
interim category with special characteristics is often discussed. 
 A fourth category of  miscellaneous cases involves pre-embryo 
disputes, including the viability of  a wrongful death action for 
destroyed pre-embryos, the various pre-embryo dispositions 
allowed, and the availability of  survivor beneits for children 
formed by ART following the death of  the intended parent.
Written Agreements
 New York decided Kass v. Kass in 1998 following a couple’s 
divorce where the ex-wife wanted custody of  pre-zygotes.32 
The Kass court held that hospital consent forms signed by both 
spouses controlled the dispute, that right of  privacy in wife’s 
reproductive choice was not implicated, and that the pre-zygotes 
were not persons and explicitly did not decide whether they 
deserved special respect. The Kass court directed that the unused 
pre-zygotes be donated to research as directed by the hospital 
consent forms and opined that the progenitors rightly made the 
decision rather than the state. 
 Washington relied upon a cryopreservation agreement 
executed by divorcing spouses in 2002 to enforce a contract 
provision for the Loma Linda Fertility Center to thaw pre-
embryos and disallow their further development.33 Husband’s 
sperm and donor eggs formed the pre-embryos in vitro. The 
Washington Supreme Court explicitly declined to decide if  the 
pre-embryos were children or whether wife was a progenitor 
though not a biological participant. 
 Texas used new gestational agreement legislation in 2006 
to determine that its public policy would permit enforceable 
agreements.34 
 Oregon held that pre-embryos were personal property in 
2008 and found no public policy to inform its decision when it 
enforced an agreement giving an ex-wife control of  pre-embryos 
she intended to destroy.35 
 Florida enforced the terms of  a dissolution settlement 
agreement in 2008 “that required wife to ‘provide’ [pre-embryos] 
to the husband so that he could dispose of  them.”36
 California decided Findley v. Lee in 2013, upholding a consent 
form agreeing to destroy any frozen embryos in the event 
of  divorce.37 California law requires clearly speciied written 
documents on embryo disposition. The Findley court found that 
public policy supported enforcement of  such contracts and 
agreements similar to advance directives and that a balancing 
of  the parties’ interests constituted a fallback position where no 
enforceable agreement existed. The Findley court held that ex-
husband’s right not to procreate was equal to ex-wife’s right to 
procreate, although the court acknowledged that wife underwent 
more invasive and repeated procedures than husband. The 
Findley court further declined to nominate the pre-embryos 
as property or life, and called them “the nascent stage of  ive 
human lives.”38
Contemporaneous Mutual Consent
 Iowa held that its child custody statute did not control the 
disposition of  pre-embryos in a dissolution where the parties 
had signed a valid hospital contract directing continued storage 
until certain events occurred requiring authorizations from 
both spouses.39 The wife was unable to conceive. Iowa’s public 
policy was against enforcing the parties’ agreement in a highly 
personal area of  reproductive choice and instead applied the 
contemporaneous mutual consent principle and made the party 
opposing destruction responsible for storage fees. 
 The McQueen decision is the only other case ordering 
contemporaneous mutual consent to resolve a pre-embryo 
dispute but as a fallback position given its facts invalidating the 
suspect cryopreservation agreement.40 
Balancing of  Interests
 In Davis v. Davis, Tennessee’s seminal case decided a frozen 
pre-embryo matter in 1992 where an ex-wife wanted control of  
“frozen embryos” for implantation post-divorce.41 The Davis trial 
court awarded “custody” to ex-wife giving her the “opportunity 
to bring these children to term through implantation.”42 The 
Tennessee Supreme Court explicitly repudiated the bright line 
rules proposed to resolve the dispute and balanced the interests 
of  each party.43 The court irst tackled the nomenclature and 
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“conclude[d] that preembryos [were] not ‘persons’ or ‘property’ 
but occup[ied] an interim category” entitled “to special respect 
because of  their potential for human life.”44 It further held that 
progenitor agreements are presumed valid and enforceable. 
The court discussed that the right of  privacy should protect 
individuals from government intrusion into the right to and 
the right not to procreate and found that the state’s interest in 
potential life in pre-embryos is not suicient to justify infringing 
upon the progenitor decisions. Ultimately, the court balanced 
the interests of  the parties and held that ex-husband’s right not 
to procreate outweighed ex-wife’s desire to donate the embryos 
but noted the decision would be closer if  use of  the pre-embryos 
constituted ex-wife’s last procreative chance.45
 Twenty years later in Reber v. Reiss, Pennsylvania determined a 
dissolution appeal in 2012 where wife lost her ability to procreate 
as a result of  cancer treatment. This prompted the spouses to 
develop pre-embryos before wife’s treatment began.  The spouses 
eventually separated and acknowledged that pre-embryos 
were marital property.46 In absence of  a signed agreement as 
to pre-embryo disposition, the Reber court held that wife’s last 
procreative chance outweighed husband’s right not to procreate 
and noted that, despite wife’s vow not to seek child support, “a 
parent cannot bind a child or bargain away that child’s right to 
support.”47 
 Illinois used last procreative chance in 2015 to award pre-
embryos to a woman who had the formed pre-embryos with her 
ex-boyfriend after her diagnosis of  lymphoma with expected 
ovarian failure following planned chemotherapy.48 The Illinois 
court found the parties entered into a binding oral agreement 
giving control of  pre-embryos to the girlfriend, which was not 
modiied by the subsequent written medical consent, but also 
upheld the trial court’s determination that girlfriend’s interests 
in procreation outweighed boyfriend’s interest in avoiding it and 
future child support. 
 The Massachusetts Supreme Court decided A.Z. v. B.Z. in 
2000 and based its permanent injunction against ex-wife’s use of  
the frozen pre-embryos on a “public policy” against ex-husband’s 
“forced procreation.”49 The A.Z. court discounted consent forms 
because husband had signed ive blank forms out of  six that wife 
subsequently completed granting her control of  the pre-embryos 
in the event of  separation or divorce.
 In the 2001 case of  J.B. v. M.B., New Jersey authorized 
destruction of  pre-embryos by wife in the absence of  any written 
agreement directing their disposition where husband’s ability 
to procreate was not lost with destruction of  the pre-embryos.50 
The so-called “J.B. rule” holds that agreements are enforceable 
if  “entered into [when the IVF process begins] subject to the 
right of  either party to change of  his or her mind [in writing] 
up to the point of  use or destruction of   . . . pre-embryos.”51 
Alternatively, the court held that husband could pay fees for 
continued storage. 
 Other countries have struggled with balancing progenitor 
interests and pre-embryo disputes. The United Kingdom 
declined to award pre-embryos that represented a woman’s last 
procreative chance where the progenitor man opposed their 
transfer to progenitor woman.52 The Grand Chamber  of  the 
European Court of  Human Rights found that pre-embryos 
do not have a right to life and that European law showed no 
consensus on when life begins.
Miscellaneous Actions
 Arizona held that a wrongful death action did not lie against 
a fertility clinic for negligent destruction of  pre-embryos because 
it declined to extend personhood to the non-viable pre-embryos 
and instead held that pre-embryos occupy an interim position 
between person and property due special respect.53 The court 
also found that an action in negligence, malpractice, breach 
of  iduciary duty, or bailment might lie. Such an action was 
iled following a storage tank failure at an Ohio fertility clinic 
which caused the loss of  more than 4,000 frozen embryos and 
gametes.54
 The United States Supreme Court decision in Astrue v. 
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claim Social Security survivor beneits for her twins conceived 
posthumously with pre-embryos formed in vitro with her 
gametes and those of  her deceased husband.55 While not a 
dispute over pre-embryos or gametes, the Astrue decision does 
inform attorneys counseling progenitors. And newspapers have 
reported grandparents seeking control of  a dead son’s semen to 
make a grandchild.56
 In a federal diversity case, the Eastern District of  Virginia 
denied motions to dismiss California residents’ attempts to 
obtain interinstitutional transfer of  their pre-zygotes from a 
Virginia Medical College to a Los Angeles clinic.57 The husband 
and wife had signed an informed consent that provided “three 
fates” of  the pre-zygotes that did not include the requested 
interinstitutional transfer.58 
Attorney Recommendations
 Pre-embryo disputes fall in the ambit of  family law, health 
law, and probate law attorneys. Missouri family law attorneys 
should prompt their clients about the existence of  pre-embryos 
or gametes, because forgetfulness, religious convictions, or moral 
reasons may prevent spouses from including pre-embryos or 
gametes in the listing of  property to be divided in dissolution. 
Unmarried and married same-sex couples and diferent-sex 
couples may have frozen ova, sperm, or pre-embryos. Attorneys 
should acquire all the agreements previously executed by 
clients using ART to determine any previous agreements as to 
disposition of  gametes or pre-embryos. Such clients typically sign 
multiple documents which might include informed treatment 
consent forms, donated gamete agreements, cryopreservation 
agreements, and surrogacy contracts (hereinafter collectively 
called “Agreements”). Family law attorneys may incorporate the 
various IVF or cryopreservation consent options discussed below 
into Agreements they might draft or evaluate in the event of  
dissolution, death, dispute, or separation between progenitors, 
intended parents, or donors.
 Missouri ART attorneys who review, draft, and negotiate 
collaborative reproduction agreements should carefully explain 
the options and consequences, but also emphasize to clients that 
the intent expressed in clinical forms typically controls in frozen 
gamete or pre-embryo disputes during dissolution or separation, 
and upon the death of  either or both signors. Alerting clients to 
the import of  such agreements informs their choices.
 Missouri probate attorneys who develop estate planning 
documents should designate whether the signatory has or may 
have frozen gametes or pre-embryos and the client/s’ wishes as 
to the disposition of  the gametes or pre-embryos that are then 
in existence, planned or not yet planned. The choices include 
thawing/destruction, donation to the other intended parent or to 
the client/s’ parents/relatives or to other named individuals, and 
donation to research. Missouri has no caselaw on parentage of  
children formed by IVF or conceived by alternative insemination 
after the death of  the intended parent who may be the 
progenitor or a partner of  a progenitor, although wrongful death 
actions do lie for a viable fetus.59 
 However, other courts have considered cases regarding 
Social Security beneits for children conceived posthumously 
by artiicial insemination with previously frozen semen or by 
embryo transfer.60 Both the American Bar Association and the 
National Conference of  Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
have developed proposals for use of  gametes or pre-embryos 
following death of  the progenitor. The American Bar Association 
(ABA) approved the Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive 
Technology, which basically adopts the “posthumous 
conception” provisions of  the Revised Uniform Parentage Act 
(RUPA).61 
 The Revised Uniform Parentage Act 2017 delineates 
parentage of  a deceased intended parent in Section 810: 
(b) Except as otherwise provided in Section 812, an 
intended parent is not a parent of  a child conceived 
by assisted reproduction under a gestational surrogacy 
agreement if  the intended parent dies before the transfer 
of  a gamete or embryo unless: 
(1) the agreement provides otherwise; and 
(2) the transfer of  a gamete or embryo occurs not later 
than [36] months after the death of  the intended parent 
or birth of  the child occurs not later than [45] months 
after the death of  the intended parent.62 
 Additionally, 
. . . the Restatement (Third) of  the Law of  Property as 
to wills and trusts contains the following language:
Unless the language or circumstances indicate the 
transferor had a diferent intention, a child of  assisted 
reproduction is treated for class gift purposes as a child 
of  a person who consented to function as a parent to 
the child and who functioned in that capacity or was 
prevented from doing so by an event such as death or 
incapacity.
Unless the language or circumstances indicate that the 
transferor had a diferent intention, a class gift that has 
not yet closed physiologically closes to future entrants on 
the distribution date if  a beneiciary of  the class gift is 
then entitled to distribution.63
 The guidance in the model act, uniform law, and restatement 
revolve around issues of  control of  gametes and pre-embryos, 
parentage, and inheritance. Timing of  the start of  pregnancy 
(conception by artiicial insemination or after embryo transfer) 
and expressed written intent are the major determinants. 
Importantly, the ABA Model Act, the RUPA, and the 
Restatement Third of  Property Law are informative but not 
controlling; Missouri has not enacted the RUPA or the ABA 
Model Act. Thus, while not controlling in Missouri, these 
documents do inform probate practitioners of  what might 
constitute national best practices. Importantly, it is state law 
that determines the availability of  Social Security beneits for 
children conceived posthumously.64 
 Health law attorneys representing reproductive medicine 
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agreement if  the intended parent dies before the transfer 
of  a gamete or embryo unless: 
(1) the agreement provides otherwise; and 
(2) the transfer of  a gamete or embryo occurs not later 
than [36] months after the death of  the intended parent 
or birth of  the child occurs not later than [45] months 
after the death of  the intended parent.62 
 Additionally, 
. . . the Restatement (Third) of  the Law of  Property as 
to wills and trusts contains the following language:
Unless the language or circumstances indicate the 
transferor had a diferent intention, a child of  assisted 
reproduction is treated for class gift purposes as a child 
of  a person who consented to function as a parent to 
the child and who functioned in that capacity or was 
prevented from doing so by an event such as death or 
incapacity.
Unless the language or circumstances indicate that the 
transferor had a diferent intention, a class gift that has 
not yet closed physiologically closes to future entrants on 
the distribution date if  a beneiciary of  the class gift is 
then entitled to distribution.63
 The guidance in the model act, uniform law, and restatement 
revolve around issues of  control of  gametes and pre-embryos, 
parentage, and inheritance. Timing of  the start of  pregnancy 
(conception by artiicial insemination or after embryo transfer) 
and expressed written intent are the major determinants. 
Importantly, the ABA Model Act, the RUPA, and the 
Restatement Third of  Property Law are informative but not 
controlling; Missouri has not enacted the RUPA or the ABA 
Model Act. Thus, while not controlling in Missouri, these 
documents do inform probate practitioners of  what might 
constitute national best practices. Importantly, it is state law 
that determines the availability of  Social Security beneits for 
children conceived posthumously.64 
 Health law attorneys representing reproductive medicine 
and cryopreservation facilities must know that IVF centers are 
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largely a self-regulated industry with no federal and few state 
laws governing them.65 The Food and Drug Administration 
regulation of  certain human cells, including gametes, to prevent 
the transmission of  communicable and infectious diseases is not 
addressed in this article.66 
 Best practices for any IVF center should require execution of  
an informed consent form/s and cryopreservation agreement by 
donors and intended parents such that they are informed of  their 
rights and options. This includes length of  storage; thawing with 
destruction; donation to each other, to other family members, 
to another family, or to science; and potential triggers for such 
options, such as length of  time, pregnancy, death, or divorce. 
Importantly, a properly executed document should lay out their 
intentions. 
 These sorts of  agreements walk a ine balance among state 
public policy, individual constitutional rights, and contractual 
rights. While courts may or may not force a progenitor to 
procreate against his/her wishes or to pay for frozen storage 
indeinitely, IVF center contracts may provide options to occur 
speciically upon a speciied length of  time, or upon death, 
divorce, a change of  heart, successful pregnancy/ies, or other 
events. The contract can specify storage fees from a progenitor 
who wants to preserve pre-embryos against the other progenitor’s 
wishes for donation or destruction. A contract may not bargain 
away child support to a party opposing embryo transfer, as the 
right of  support belongs to the child. 
 Other provisions that IVF or cryopreservation clinical forms 
should contain include: distinguishing oral or written agreements 
between parties with contracts or forms executed with IVF/
cryopreservation centers; the center’s deinition of  abandoned 
gametes/pre-embryos and their policies upon abandonment, 
including the center’s options to thaw and destroy or donate 
abandoned gametes/pre-embryos to science; the center’s policy 
upon its own closure; and the center’s liability for lost, misused, 
or accidentally destroyed gametes/pre-embryos. Abandonment 
of  pre-embryos has been deined as couples not paying for 
continued storage of  their pre-embryos or gametes.67 
 Health law attorneys should consider inclusion in their 
Agreements the rule developed in J.B.that pre-embryo 
agreements are enforceable if  entered into when the IVF process 
begins, subject to the right of  either party to signify a change of  
his/her mind in writing up to the point of  use or destruction of  
pre-embryos.68 Attorneys would also be wise to include a caveat 
that the efect of  §§ 1.205, 188.010, and 188.015 or subsequent 
legislation as discussed below may inluence clinic conduct where 
thawing, destroying, or scientiic use of  pre-embryos might 
constitute a crime. However, the McQueen deinition of  pre-
embryos as property of  a special character may inluence IVF 
facility concerns regarding criminal penalties attaching around 
the disposition of  frozen pre-embryos. 
 None of  the courts in the United States cases on pre-embryo 
disputes found that pre-embryos constituted human beings, 
although Louisiana law provides that an IVF ovum is a juridical 
person, and New Mexico law requires that an IVF embryo be 
stored until transferred or donated.69
 While McQueen’s case was on appeal, she approached 
Rep. John McCaherty, who unsuccessfully introduced House 
Bill 2558 during the 2016 Missouri legislative session.70 HB 
2558 would have directed courts to render custody decisions 
for preimplantation frozen embryos utilizing certain criteria 
and included a best interest of  the embryo factor.71 Rep. Mike 
Moon introduced House Joint Resolution 53 in the 2018 
legislative session to hold a general/special election to amend the 
constitution to declare life in every preborn human child at every 
stage of  development from the moment of  conception.72 This 
measure also failed to gain legislative approval.
 Scientists argue that such laws, and perhaps the Missouri 
proposal, would not just prevent abortion and the embryonic 
stem cell research that might constitute the motivation behind 
such laws, but also signiicantly restrict infertility treatments 
including IVF, cryopreservation of  pre-embryos and gametes, 
and treatment to remove life-threatening ectopic pregnancies.73 
Given that more than 2,000 Missourians utilized assisted 
reproduction more than ive years ago, legislation that restricts 
ART treatment for infertility would afect many Missourians.
Conclusion
 Assisted reproductive technologies are widely used, including 
in Missouri. The McQueen decision makes pre-embryos property 
deserving special respect and subject to marital division. 
While the McQueen decision explicitly did not decide if  a valid 
agreement about pre-embryo disposition was enforceable in 
Missouri, the court notes other states which are enforcing such 
agreements. And most state courts agree that efectuating the 
intent of  the progenitors is the best outcome in a dispute over 
pre-embryos. To that end, lawyers should carefully craft clinic 
treatment consent forms for gamete collection, alternative 
insemination, in vitro fertilization, embryo transfer, and 
cryopreservation agreements; agreements for gamete donation, 
embryo transfer, and surrogacy; and all probate instruments such 
that the intent of  all relevant parties is clearly explained and 
memorialized. 
 Importantly, attorneys should guarantee that every party to 
any such agreement is represented by independent counsel, for 
to do otherwise allows a party to act in ignorance in a matter of  
constitutional signiicance, to allege ignorance or undue inluence 
in a dispute, or to lodge a complaint against an attorney for 
conlict of  interest or representing one perhaps more powerful 
party to an agreement where the other party goes unadvised. A 
waiver of  conlict agreement is appropriate where a couple hires 
the same attorney to represent each of  them.
 Best practices for Missouri family, health, and probate 
attorneys would problem solve issues presented in decisions 
made in other states and by the U.S. Supreme Court as well 
as provisions found in model and uniform laws. These issues 
commonly include property division in dissolution or separation 
or other triggers, motivation for ART participation, last 
procreative chance, beliefs regarding destruction of  pre-embryos, 
and progenitor and intended parent intent for gametes and pre-
embryos following death. 
 As McQueen noted, science does indeed outpace legislation. 
Nonetheless, many Missourians are utilizing ART and scientists 
are now gene-editing human embryo cells via CRISPR to 
“correct defective genes that cause inherited diseases.”74 
Legislation to adopt RUPA 2017 would promote the welfare 
of  the thousands of  Missourians utilizing assisted reproduction 
to form a family and the potential to spare would-be children 
inherited diseases. 
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